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COMMENT
Rethinking "The Plan": Why ERISA Section
502(a)(2) Should Allow Recovery to
Individual Defined Contribution Pension
Plan Accounts
REGINA L. READLINGj-
INTRODUCTION
The first cohorts of the baby boom generation are
reaching the age of retirement,' and in 2008, will start to
leave the labor force. 2 This demographic shift will generate
a slowing of economic growth, just as spending on Social
t Managing Editor, Buffalo Law Review, 2007-2008; J.D. Candidate, Class of
2008, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School; B.S. Bates College. I
would like to thank Professor Jim Wooten for his comments on earlier drafts as
well as my Editor, Amy C. Frisch, for her continued assistance throughout the
entire publication process. I owe much gratitude to Elliot Kowalski and Tatiana
Markel whose friendship over the last two years has been a constant and
unwavering source of laughter and joy in my life. This Comment is dedicated to
my parents, Joseph A. Readling and Yvonne M. Lucia who have taught me the
importance of setting goals and who continue to patiently offer support,
guidance, and encouragement as I strive to achieve them.
1. Alicia H. Munnell, Steven A. Sass & Jean-Pierre Aubry, Employer Survey:
1 of 4 Boomers Won't Retire Because They Can't (Ctr. for Ret. Research at
Boston Coll., Work Opportunities for Older Americans Series No. 6, Dec. 2006),
available at http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/issues/wob-6.pdf.
2. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. GAO-07-342T, LONG-TERM
BUDGET OUTLOOK: SAVING OUR FUTURE REQUIRES TOUGH CHOICES TODAY 13
(Jan. 2007).
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Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will begin to accelerate. 3
Understandably, this news has precipitated a marked
increase in awareness and concern about the importance of
planning for retirement. "Retirement Calculators" are in
abundant supply on the Internet.4 Both print and broadcast
media outlets run feature segments on the financial and
familial impact of the upcoming generational shift. 5
Governmental agencies and private think tanks advocate
the importance of early planning to prepare for financial
security upon reaching retirement.6
Many individuals plan for their retirement years by
participating in employer- sponsored savings programs. 7
These retirement programs may be structured as defined
benefit or defined contribution arrangements, both of which
are governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA).s ERISA ensures that pension plans
provide their participants and beneficiaries with the
benefits they have been promised.9
When ERISA was enacted, most Americans participating
in employer-sponsored private pension programs were
3. Id.
4. E.g., Bloomberg.com, Calculators, http://www.bloomberg.com/invest/
calculators/retire.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2008); MSN Money, Retirement
Planner, http://moneycentral.msn.com/retire/planner.aspx (last visited Mar. 9,
2008); see also Charles Schwab, Retirement Investment, http://www.schwab.
com/public/schwab/planning/retirement/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2008).
5. See, e.g., NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams: Baby Boomers Seek
Help for Elder Care (NBC television broadcast Dec. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16301736/; U.S. News Money and Business,
Advice on Retirement Planning and Investing, http://www.usnews.com/sections/
business/retirement (last visited Mar. 9, 2008); Liz Davidson, Your Employee
Benefits: How Much Should You Save For Retirement?, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS,
Sept. 2003, available at http://www.njit.edu/humanresources/pdf/youremployee
benefits.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Social Security Online, Retirement Planner, http://www.ssa.gov
retire2/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2008); AARP.org, Retirement, http://www.aarp.org/
research/worklretirement/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
7. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WHAT You
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT YOUR RETIREMENT PLAN 1 (2006), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/wyskgreenbook.pdf; Colleen E. Medill, Stock
Market Volatility and 401(K) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 469, 469 (2001).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)-(35) (2000).
9. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 3 (2004).
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enrolled in defined benefit plans. Now, however, defined
contribution plans-which include employee stock ownership
plans, money purchase pension plans, and the 401(k)-
dominate the private pension landscape. 1° These defined
contribution arrangements share one common characteristic:
all provide an individual account for each participant."
Upon retirement, a participant's benefits are based solely
on the amount contributed to the individual account over
the span of enrollment in the defined contribution plan.12
In its efforts to champion financial security for
Americans during their post-retirement years, ERISA
established federal standards that require pension plan
administration in accordance with certain reporting,
vesting, and funding mandates. 13 Further, it adopted and
codified the equitable common law trust principles which
govern fiduciary conduct and civil enforcement. 14 Yet,
despite these safeguards, ERISA failed to protect defined
contribution plan participants who, upon a breach of
fiduciary duty, found themselves with depleted individual
retirement accounts and without a meaningful remedy.
The plight of James LaRue illustrates this conundrum.
LaRue was a participant in his employer-sponsored 401(k)
retirement savings plan.15 Accordingly, LaRue managed his
own portfolio by directing his contributions among the
numerous investment options offered by the plan.16 In 2001
and 2002, LaRue allegedly instructed his plan to make
specific changes to the investments in his individual
account. These changes were never made and, consequently,
LaRue's retirement savings was depleted by approximately
$150,000.17 Unfortunately, until the Supreme Court heard
10. See discussion on the shift from defined pension plans to defined
contribution plans infra Part II.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34).
12. Id. § 1002(34).
13. Id. §§ 1001-1085.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1132 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
15. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 450 F.3d 570, 572 (4th Cir.
2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).
16. Id.
17. Id. It is unclear whether the "alleged $150,000 injury represents a
decline in the value of assets that DeWolff should have sold or an increase in
the value of assets that DeWolff should have purchased." LaRue v. DeWolff,
2008] 317
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his case, LaRue was without a remedy because his 401(k)
plan (his individual retirement account) was not considered
a "plan" for ERISA's civil enforcement purposes.
This Comment attributes the loophole in participant
protection to the fact that ERISA was adopted prior to the
proliferation of defined contribution plans. Further, "[n]o
significant amendments to either ERISA's fiduciary
provisions or its remedial provisions have been enacted
since the passage of the statute in 1974."18 As such, federal
courts faced great difficulty in attempting to apply ERISA's
statutory provisions to situations of fiduciary breach
involving defined contribution plan sponsors. 19 Part IV of
this Comment discusses the three landmark ERISA
Supreme Court cases (Russell,20 Mertens,21 and Great-
West 22) and subsequently evaluates the misapplication of
ERISA civil enforcement sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3).
Finally, using the plight of James LaRue, Part V of this
Comment explores the obstacles these precedents posed,
and discusses the Supreme Court's new interpretation of
section 502(a)(2) of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. 23
LaRue provided the judiciary with the factual scenario
necessary to appropriately reevaluate current precedent in
light of the dominance of and dependence on the defined
contribution plan. Such an evaluation was long overdue. 24
The modernized interpretation of section 502(a)(2)
adopted in LaRue recognizes the prevalence and structure
Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1024 n.4 (2008).
18. Dana Muir, ERISA and Investment Issues, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 199, 247
(2004).
19. Medill, supra note 7, at 476 (clarifying that, "[this] chronology explains
in large part the interpretative difficulties and related policy choices the federal
courts will confront in attempting to apply ERISA's statutory provisions to
employers who sponsor 401(k) plans").
20. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
21. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
22. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
23. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).
24. It had been over twenty years since the Supreme Court evaluated an
issue dealing with 502(a)(2). See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134 (1985). Unfortunately, this outdated precedent guided our judiciary's
decision regarding recovery to the "plan" for more than two decades, which did
not include the defined contribution arrangement.
[Vol. 56318
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of defined contribution plans, and in doing so, allows for
individual retirement accounts to be considered "plans" for
the purpose of obtaining relief for breach of fiduciary duty.
Approximately $3 trillion of our nation's assets are held
in defined contribution plans.25 Consequently, the impact of
embracing a new interpretation of section 502(a)(2) will be
significant. Redefining "plan" to encompass the individual
defined contribution accounts upon which millions of
Americans are relying in preparation for financial security
during retirement years will only strengthen ERISA's goal
of ensuring that Americans get the benefits they were
promised.
I. ERISA: THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act was
signed by President Gerald Ford on September 2, 1974,
after decades of congressional concern regarding the role of
private pension plans in the nation's retirement security
program. 26 During its study of the pre-ERISA pension
landscape, Congress concluded that pension plans were
integral to the financial security of employees and their
families.27 However, this investigation also revealed that
many participants received insufficient information and
inadequate protection of their enforceable rights under
retirement plans. 28
While drafting ERISA, Congress aimed to remedy the
deficiencies that plagued the nation's pension structure. 29
Pursuant to this congressional intent, ERISA required
benefit plan managers to adhere to strict standards of
25. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUND
ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, THIRD QUARTER
2006, at 112 (2007), available at http://www.federalrelease.gov/releases/Zl/
current/zl.pdf [hereinafter BOARD OF GOVERNORS].
26. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., Employee Benefits in the United
States: An Introduction, in FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 3,
4 (2005), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/Fnd05.Prt0l.
ChpOl.pdf [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS, CHAPTER 1].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 5.
3192008]
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fiduciary conduct as well as minimum vesting, funding, and
reporting standards in order to obtain and maintain
favorable tax treatment. 30 In doing so, ERISA expanded the
breadth and reliability of pension plans, and ultimately,
increased the number of participants eligible for retirement
benefits. 31 These major reforms made pension security "a
basic goal of federal policy," and as a result, ensured that
employees, in preparing for retirement, "actually received
the benefits their retirement plan promised."32
A. Defined Benefit Plans
Defined benefit plans promise to pay participants a
specified amount of benefits upon retirement.33 In this type
of plan, benefit amounts are determined by a set formula
included in the written plan instrument. 34 Including this
formula in the plan document ensures that participants
know the methodology upon which their benefits are
calculated. Although there are several defined benefit
formulas from which sponsors may choose when structuring
pension plans, these formulas are typically based upon the
employee's earnings, the employee's length of service, or a
combination of both factors.35 For example, a "Final-Pay
Formula" awards post-retirement benefits based on average
earnings, usually at the last five years of a participant's
career, when the earnings are highest. 36 Pension benefits
are calculated by multiplying a percentage of the participant's
final average earnings by the participant's total years of
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. WOOTEN, supra note 9, at 3.
33. U.S. Department of Labor Employee Benefits Security Administration,
Protect Your Pension - A Quick Reference Guide, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
Publications/protectyour-pension.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1), (b)(1) (2000) (requiring that every employee
benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written
instrument); EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., Defined Benefit and Defined
Contribution Plans: Understanding the Differences, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS (1997), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/
books/fundamentals/fund05.pdf [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS, CHAPTER 5].
35. FUNDAMENTALS, CHAPTER 5, supra note 34.
36. Id.
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service. 37
ERISA does not dictate certain amounts, percentages,
or values of benefits that a plan sponsor must provide to a
participant or beneficiary upon retirement. Instead, the
statute affords plan sponsors ample flexibility in designing
and implementing benefit formulas that best meet their
needs in light of employee demographics and actuarial
projections. However, as a trade-off for the lack of provisions
guaranteeing benefit amounts, ERISA provides other
safeguards to ensure participants' rights to non-forfeitable
benefit payments upon retirement. 38
For example, ERISA establishes minimum vesting
standards that protect participants' rights to their accrued
benefit payments upon retirement. 39 Thus, a defined benefit
plan satisfies ERISA's vesting requirements if a participant's
right to 100 percent of his or her normal retirement benefit
is non-forfeitable after five years of completed service. 40
With easily referenced benefit formulas and strict vesting
standards, employers offering defined benefit pension plans
must make regular contributions to the plan's retirement
fund in order to provide for participants' future benefits. 41
Consequently, it is the defined benefit plan sponsor who
bears the ultimate risk of providing the guaranteed level of
benefits upon a participant's retirement. 42
B. Defined Contribution Plans
Unlike defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans
do not offer guaranteed benefit levels upon retirement. 43
Instead, employers "promise to make annual or periodic
37. Id.
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1055 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (outlining participation and
vesting coverage, benefit accrual requirements, and the requirement of joint
and survivor annuity benefits).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2000).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A) (2000). Also, note that a defined benefit plan
satisfies ERISA's vesting requirements if the participant has a non-forfeitable
right to a percentage of the accrued benefits determined by the table provided
in 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B) (2006).
41. FUNDAMENTALS, CHAPTER 5, supra note 34.
42. Id.
43. Id.
2008] 321
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
contributions to accounts set up for their employees."44 For
this reason, defined contribution plans are often understood
as individual plan accounts. 45 An employer's contribution to
a defined contribution plan may be correlated to a percentage
of the employee's salary or based on an employee's years of
service.46 There may be only employer contributions, employee
contributions, or both. 47 Upon retirement, the payable
benefit is the total of the accumulated monies in each
employee's individual account. 48
II. THE SHIFT FROM DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS To DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLANS
Although ERISA's civil enforcement provisions have
been interpreted to afford plan participants with individual
retirement accounts little protection in the face of fiduciary
breach, ironically, one of the most important developments
in private pension policy has been identified as the
transformation of a retirement system once dominated by
defined benefit plans to one now typified by defined
contribution plans. 49 In 1980, eighty-four percent of full
time employees participating in employee benefit programs
sponsored by medium and large private establishments
were enrolled in defined benefit plans. 50 However, by 2003,
participation in defined benefit plans shrunk to thirty-three
percent, while the number of employees participating in
defined contribution plans ballooned to fifty-one percent.5 1
44. Id.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006) (explaining that a "defined contribution
plan" is a "pension plan which provides for an individual account for each
participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the
participant's account").
46. FUNDAMENTALS, CHAPTER 5, supra note 34.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE:
EVIDENCE, ANALYSIS, AND POLICY 4 (1997).
50. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., Participation in Employee Benefit
Programs, in EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (2005), http://www.ebri.
org/pdflpublications/books/databooklDB.Chapter%2004.pdf [hereinafter EBRI
DATABOOK].
51. Id.
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Numerous explanations have been offered to account
for this change in the national pension landscape. 52 Federal
law, itself, is thought to be partially responsible. 53 Although
ERISA was initially regarded as championing retirement
security for American workers with pensions, it has been
criticized for contributing to the decline of defined benefit
pensions. 54 While ERISA created regulatory standards for
defined benefit and defined contribution plans alike, the net
effect of these rules appears to solely affect defined contribution
plans. 55 As new tax laws and plan requirements pose major
disincentives to operating defined benefit plans, defined
contribution plan regulations are not as numerous and have
remained much more static over the years.56
A. The Regulatory Environment
Regulated by two oversight groups with often conflicting
goals, pension plans are administered in an environment
that is known to experience frequent change.57 While the
Internal Revenue Service focuses its regulations on the size
of tax preference provided to plans and their sponsors, the
Department of Labor is concerned with raising coverage
and protecting participants' benefits. 58 Despite the fact that
the changing regulations impact both defined benefit and
defined contribution plans, data suggest that the cost of
compliance with the last fifteen to twenty years of
regulations has disproportionately affected defined benefit
52. WILLIAM G. GALE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE SHIFT FROM DEFINED
BENEFIT TO DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 13 (1999), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/es/events/erisa/99Papers/erisa2.pdf (report prepared
for conference titled "ERISA After 25 Years: A Framework for Evaluating
Pension Reform").
53. See WOOTEN, supra note 9, at 3.
54. Picking up the Enron Pieces: Hearing on Retirement Security Before the
S. Finance Comm., 107th Cong. 2 (2002) (statement of Jack L. VanDerhei),
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/testimony/t135.pdf [hereinafter
Retirement Security].
55. Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The Changing Face of Private
Retirement Plans, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, Apr. 2001, at 5-6, available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/040lib.pdf.
56. Id. at 4, 7.
57. GALE ET AL., supra note 52, at 14.
58. Id.
2008] 323
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plans.5 9 It is estimated that the cumulative effect of
changes in the regulatory environment has led to increases
in the cost of a defined benefit plan from approximately 140
percent of a defined contribution plan cost in 1992 to more
than 210 percent in 1996.60
B. Work Force Characteristics
In addition to a fluctuating regulatory environment, the
demise of the traditional defined benefit plan has been
attributed to changing patterns of employment, and more
generally, changing work force characteristics. Unionized
workers are more likely to be participants in defined benefit
plans than their non-unionized counterparts.61 Further,
data show that employees in the manufacturing industry
are more likely than those in retail or service industries to
take part in employers' defined benefit plans. 62 Therefore,
much of the change in the defined benefit market share has
been attributed to the decline in unionized pension covered
workers. More specifically, this decline is due to an overall
shift away from large, unionized firms in the manufacturing
sector, to nonunion jobs in smaller firms in service
industries-where defined contribution plans are in the
majority. 63
Despite these industry-wide changes, on a smaller scale,
employee preference for participation in defined contribution
plans is also a factor in the shift away from defined benefit
plans. 64 In fact, plan sponsors who switched from offering
defined benefit to defined contribution plans identify
matching worker characteristics and providing for employee
preference as the primary motivation for their change. 65
With relatively liberal vesting provisions, defined contribution
59. VanDerhei & Copeland, supra note 55, at 5-6, 14.
60. Edwin C. Hustead, Trends in Retirement Income Plan Administrative
Expenses, in LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: REMAKING
RESPONSIBILITY FOR RETIREMENT 166, 173 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J.
Schieber eds., 1998).
61. WOOTEN, supra note 9, at 279.
62. Id. Also see the data in IPPOLITO, supra note 49, at 82-83.
63. IPPOLITO, supra note 49, at 5.
64. Id.
65. GALE ET AL., supra note 52, at 13.
324 [Vol. 56
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plans offer distinct advantages to employees who change
jobs frequently. 66 Where defined contribution plans often
afford partial vesting of employer contributions after two or
three years of service, defined benefit plans offer cliff
vesting, which does not guarantee vesting of benefits until
the employee works a set number of years. 67
In addition to cliff vesting, young workers are thought
to disapprove of the "back loaded" feature associated with
traditional defined benefit plans. In "back loaded" plans,
employees vest in formulas based on a percentage of either
career average or final pay salary.68 Therefore, "back
loaded" defined benefit plans reward older workers who
have stayed in the same job, or with the same employer, for
the entire span of their working life. 69 Because today's
younger workforce may anticipate numerous career changes
over the course of a lifetime, it may be beneficial to rely on
the faster vesting scheme and benefit transferability as
offered by defined contribution plans.70 Further, defined
contribution plans give participants access to money prior
to retirement; this is known to prove attractive to young
workers and families in cases of financial hardship and
termination of employment. 71
66. FUNDAMENTALS, CHAPTER 5, supra note 34, at 5.
67. Id. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2004) (establishing
that a defined benefit plan meets ERISA's minimum vesting standards if a
participant, who has completed five years of service has a nonforfeitable right to
100 percent of the accrued benefit), with 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(4) (Supp. 2004)
(establishing that a defined contribution plan meets ERISA's minimum vesting
standards if a participant, who has completed three years of services has a
nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of the accrued benefit). Along these same
lines, compare the minimum vesting standards set forth in the tables found in
29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B) (2000) and 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 2004).
Further, employees who wish to become eligible in 401(k) defined contribution
plan arrangements may become eligible after completing only one year of service.
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., 401(k) Cash or Deferred Arrangements, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 93, 94 (1997),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/fundO8.pdf [hereinafter
FUNDAMENTALS, CHAPTER 8].
68. VanDerhei & Copeland, supra note 55, at 5-6.
69. See id. (explaining that generally, back loaded defined benefit plans
provide the majority of plan benefits in the final years before retirement).
70. FUNDAMENTALS, CHAPTER 1, supra note 26, at 10.
71. Id. at 10-11.
2008] 325
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C. The 401(k) Plan
The increase in the number of defined contribution
plans is almost wholly attributable to the availability of the
401(k) plan, a new savings arrangement that did not exist
when ERISA was signed into law. 72
While the number of defined benefit pension plans has
declined, the number of 401(k) plans has grown dramatically.
Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code did not exist in
1974-when ERISA was passed-and plans named for this
tax code section did not really begin their growth until the
early 1980s. 73
The Revenue Act of 1978 added section 401(k) to the
Internal Revenue Code, 74 and subsequently, between 1983
and 1995, a majority of the net growth experienced by
defined contribution plans was propelled by the expansion
of 401(k)s. 75 Gale et al. explain:
The number of 401(k) plans grew by the same amount as the total
growth in [defined contribution] plans .... Active participants in
401(k)s grew by 28 million, while the number of active
participants in all [defined contribution] plans grew by only 15
million .... Over 80 percent of the growth of DC plan assets
between 1983 and 1995 occurred in 401(k) plans, as did more than
100 percent of the net growth in both contributions and benefits. 76
This retirement savings plan allows employees, on an
individual basis, to contribute a percentage of their wages
into a retirement account on a voluntary, pretax basis. 77
Unlike traditional defined benefit plans, which are unable
to account for the preferences of employees on an individual
basis, 401(k) plans offer a flexibility that allows individual
72. WOOTEN, supra note 9, at 279.
73. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 107th
Cong. (Feb. 27, 2002) (testimony of Erik Olsen, Board Member of AARP),
available at http://republicans.edlabor.house.gov/archive/hearings/lO7th/eer/
enronfour22702/olsen.htm.
74. FUNDAMENTALS, CHAPTER 8, supra note 67, at 1.
75. GALE ETAL., supra note 52, at 6.
76. Id.
77. WOOTEN, supra note 9, at 279.
326 [Vol. 56
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employees to tailor their plan to best suit their preference. 78
Ironically, while this flexibility affords individual plan
participants a range of investment options and opportunities,
the inherent structure of the defined contribution plan,
providing an individual retirement account for each
participant, 79 has been used to preclude protection and
recovery owed to those injured by breach of fiduciary duty.8 0
While the intricacies of ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions and Supreme Court precedent will be discussed
in detail below, in light of this inequity and mounting
reliance on the 401(k) plan as a vehicle for providing
retirement security, this Comment advocates for a new
interpretation of ERISA section 502(a)(2).
III. ERISA's CIVIL ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
In order to understand how application and
interpretation of section 502(a)(2) has precluded recovery to
defined contribution plan participants aggrieved by a
breach of fiduciary duty, an overview of ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions is necessary. In the 1950s and
1960s, congressional committee investigations into pension
and benefit plans revealed labor unions steeped in corruption,
as well as widespread looting of plan funds through
"sweetheart" and kickback deals.81 Congress responded by
drafting into the statute strict standards of fiduciary
responsibility governing those with discretionary power
78. See id. (explaining that defined benefit plans cannot vary pretax
contributions to fit savings preferences of individual employees, where 401(k)
plans are able to accommodate variation in employee's preferences for saving).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2000).
80. See id. § 1109(a) (requiring that a fiduciary who breaches any of the
responsibilities and obligations set forth in ERISA must make good to the plan
(as opposed to making good to an individual account)). This provision has been
used by defendants in arguing that all plan participants be harmed by a breach
of fiduciary duty in order to recover for breach of fiduciary duty. See Milofsky v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 404 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2005), vacated en banc, 442 F.3d 311
(5th Cir. 2006); In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420 F.3d. 231 (3rd
Cir. 2005).
81. John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By "Equitable": The Supreme
Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1317, 1324 (2003).
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over plan assets,8 2 and also provided civil enforcement
provisions designed to guarantee plan participants and
beneficiaries appropriate remedies, possible sanctions, and
access to the Federal Courts.8 3
Congress adopted ERISA's standards of fiduciary
conduct and civil enforcement scheme from common law
standards of trust law.8 4 Under this common law scheme, a
three-part remedial system was available upon a trustee's
breach of fiduciary duty.85 Depending on the nature and
circumstances of the breach, an aggrieved trust beneficiary
was allowed to sue either for (1) the loss incurred, (2) for
any profits the trustee made as a result of the breach, or (3)
for any gains that would have accrued but for the breach.8 6
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions are modeled after this
system, which allowed recovery for loss, restitution of
profits, and recovery of foregone gains.8 7 The significance
and impact of rooting ERISA's fiduciary standards and civil
enforcement provisions in the common law of trusts will be
further examined upon discussion of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the statute.
ERISA's civil enforcement scheme provides an aggrieved
participant or beneficiary with an exclusive88 six part list of
remedial possibilities.8 9 Although all are available, sections
502(a)(4), (5), and (6) have been considered "peripheral"
provisions, and sections 502(a)(1), (2), and (3)-the vehicles
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000).
83. Id. § 1001(b).
84. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 1333.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1333-34 (citing 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN Scorr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 237 (4th ed. 1988)).
87. Id. at 1334.
88. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)
(explaining that "[t]he six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions
found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted . . . provide strong evidence
that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly").
89. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)-(6) (2000 & Supp. 2004). The importance of the
exclusivity of these provisions, in light of ERISA's strict preemption doctrine
will be discussed below. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (establishing that
provisions of Title I and Title IV of ERISA shall supersede any State laws that
relate to employee benefit plans).
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through which the majority of claims by ERISA participants
and beneficiaries are enforced. 90
Section 502(a)(1) allows participants and beneficiaries
to bring actions in order to recover past benefits due or to
clarify rights to future benefits under the plan.91 Consider
the following hypothetical:
Suzy is a participant in her employer's health insurance plan. 92
After being diagnosed with cancer, Suzy's oncologist recommends
chemotherapy regime X. Chemotherapy X recently completed
clinical trials. Lauded as a "miracle treatment," Pharmaceutical
Company Y is currently seeking FDA approval for its very
expensive drug. Suzy's health insurance plan stipulates that it will
not pay for this "experimental treatment." Consequently, on
March 1, the plan denies coverage for Chemotherapy X. Suzy
decides that she will pay for Chemotherapy X with personal
savings and on March 2, she commences the treatment. A week
later, on March 9, the FDA approves Chemotherapy X.
Under section 502(a)(1)(B), Suzy may have a remedy. If
she can successfully argue that her health insurance plan
was incorrect in denying coverage due to the "experimental"
nature of Chemotherapy X, Suzy can recoup the costs of
paying for the treatment herself; these are the "benefits due
to [her] under the terms of [her] plan."93 Regularly evoked
under routine benefit denial claims with little trouble,
section 502(a)(1)(B) has been called the "workhorse of
ERISA remedy law."94  As such, further discussion
regarding section 502(a)(1) in light of defined contribution
plans is moot, and thus this analysis will focus specifically
on sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3).
Section 502(a)(2) is the enforcement mechanism which
provides aggrieved plan participants appropriate relief
90. Langbein, supra note 81, at 1334.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
92. ERISA covers both pension and welfare plans. Welfare plans may be
maintained to provide medical, surgical, or other benefits in the event of
sickness. ERISA's civil enforcement and remedy provisions govern these welfare
plans, as well as defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans. As
such, although this hypothetical uses a welfare plan, the application of
501(a)(1)(b) works similarly in the pension plan scenario.
93. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
94. Langbein, supra note 81, at 1334.
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upon breach of fiduciary duty.95 Every employee benefit plan
must be established and maintained by a written instrument,
and this instrument must provide for one or more named
fiduciaries who possess the authority to control, manage,
operate, and administer the plan.96 Under ERISA, a person
is a fiduciary to the extent he or she exercises discretionary
authority or control over management of a plan or its
assets, has the authority or responsibility to render
investment advice, or possesses any discretionary authority
in the administration of the plan.9 7
However, in establishing its realm of fiduciary
responsibility, ERISA does not limit its ambit of fiduciary
obligations to only those individuals named in the plan
documents. A person may adopt fiduciary responsibility by
either "word" or by "deed."98 This means that an individual
who exhibits managerial discretion over plan assets will be
required to abide by ERISA's standards of fiduciary
conduct, despite the fact that they may not be listed as a
fiduciary in the plan's documents.9 9 Regardless of how one
assumes fiduciary responsibility, ERISA further codifies
and imposes upon fiduciaries two great principles of trust
law, obligations of loyalty and prudence.100
The fiduciary duty of loyalty requires that one
"discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries, and for the
exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and
beneficiaries."'101 Generally speaking, this duty compels a
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000) (providing for appropriate relief under
section 409; liability for breach of fiduciary duty).
96. Id. § 1102(a)(1).
97. Id. § 1002(21)(A).
98. See Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308-09 (5th Cir. 1984) (describing
how Wanda Jo Mercer, referred to as a "trustee" and who acted in an official
capacity was a "fiduciary" under ERISA because, "[i]f it talks like a duck ...
and walks like a duck.., it is a duck").
99. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2000) (noting that a "named fiduciary" means
a fiduciary who is named in the plan instrument); IT Corp. v. General Am. Life
Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 1415, 1419 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that there is a
difference between a "named fiduciary" and a "fiduciary," as a named fiduciary
is only a subset of a fiduciary).
100. Langbein, supra note 81, at 1325.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
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fiduciary, in making discretionary decisions involving plan
assets, to do so to ultimately maximize the benefit that will
run to plan participants and beneficiaries. The fiduciary
responsibility of prudence is more procedural in nature,
requiring that a fiduciary act with the same standard of
care "that a prudent man acting in a like capacity ... would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims. ' 10 2 This objective standard is similar to tort
law's "reasonable person rule" and requires that a plan
fiduciary carry out his or her duties to the same extent as a
"similarly situated decisionmaker."'103
In addition to the duties of loyalty and prudence,
fiduciaries are bound by the duty of diversification. 104 This
requires that a fiduciary diversely manage the assets of the
plan to safeguard from the risk of large losses.10 5 Lastly,
ERISA stipulates that a fiduciary discharge all duties in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing
the plan. 0 6
The interplay between fiduciary responsibility and
liability for breach of one's fiduciary duties is seen in
section 502(a)(2) of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. 10 7
Specifically, section 502(a)(2) provides that, "A civil action
may be brought by the Secretary [of Labor], or by a
participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief
under section [409]."108 Thus, a closer look at ERISA section
409 provides a better explanation of what type of relief an
aggrieved participant injured by a breach of fiduciary duty
may seek.
Section 409(a) stipulates that:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make
good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
102. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
103. Langbein, supra note 81, at 1325-26.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2000).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
107. Id. § 1132(a)(2).
108. Id.
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breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of
such fiduciary. 10
9
Thus, consider the following hypothetical scenario:
Mr. Fiduciary of Plan XYZ was tired and overworked. After
deciding that he deserved a vacation, Mr. Fiduciary embezzled
$10,000 from his defined benefit plan's general investment fund
and headed straight to the airport. After buying a round trip ticket
and booking hotel reservations for his stay in Tahiti, Mr. Fiduciary
had only $1 of embezzled funds remaining. On his way to the gate
to board the plane, Mr. Fiduciary bought a lottery ticket. The next
day, while enjoying the sand and the surf, Mr. Fiduciary noticed a
small story in his Tahitian newspaper reporting on the largest
American lottery payout in history; only one winning ticket had
been sold. Upon further investigation, Mr. Fiduciary discovered
that he in fact had won $230 million! Ecstatic, Mr. Fiduciary
settled back on his beach blanket and smiled. Now, without
anyone ever noticing, he could pay back the $10,000 he had
embezzled, and keep the rest of his winnings for himself. Couldn't
he?
Unfortunately for Mr. Fiduciary, and fortunately for the
plan, this is not the case. By embezzling funds from defined
benefit Plan XYZ, Mr. Fiduciary is not discharging his
duties for the sole interest of participants and
beneficiaries. 110 Thus, to enforce their rights under ERISA,
Plan XYZ's participants can initiate a claim under section
502(a)(2) for appropriate relief for Mr. Fiduciary's breach of
fiduciary duty section 409(a). 111 Interestingly, not only
would Mr. Fiduciary be personally liable to the plan for the
$10,000 of embezzled funds; he would also owe his entire
lottery jackpot. Because the lottery ticket was purchased
with the last $1 of Mr. Fiduciary's embezzlement, the
lottery prize, in ERISA terms, is a profit of a fiduciary made
through the use of assets of the plan, and as such, under
section 409(a), Mr. Fiduciary is required to restore this
109. Id. § 1109(a).
110. See id. § 1104(a).
111. See id. § 1132(a)(2).
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profit to the plan.112
Imposing personal liability on a fiduciary to "make good
to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach" 113 is a relatively straightforward concept. However,
the fact that ERISA was enacted prior to the increase in
defined contribution plan participation should not be
overlooked. 114 Defining "the plan" for purposes of section 409
and relief under section 502(a)(2) has proved troublesome in
light of the shift from defined benefit plans to prevailing
defined contribution pension arrangements, which are
structured as individual retirement accounts." 5 Thus, where
these interpretive difficulties preclude recovery under
section 502(a)(2), aggrieved participants are forced to turn
elsewhere for a remedy.
Section 502(a)(3), is often considered the civil enforcement
"catchall provision"" 6 and allows a participant, beneficiary,
or fiduciary to enjoin a practice in violation of ERISA, and
also provides an opportunity to obtain "appropriate equitable
relief." 7 Unfortunately, just as interpretation of section
409(a) has sparked confusion in light of the proliferation of
individual account-based retirement plans, application of
section 502(a)(3) has become very limited due to restrictive
Supreme Court precedent. 118
IV. TRACING THE PROBLEM: THE SUPREME COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF ERISA's CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
PROVISIONS
In order to fully explain why ERISA has proven
inadequate in providing remedies to defined contribution
plan participants harmed by fiduciary breach, an
112. See id. § 1109(a).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Medill, supra note 7, at 476.
115. See, e.g., LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 458 F.3d 359 (4th
Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008); Milofsky v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 442
F.3d 311, 311 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420
F.3d. 231, 232; Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995); In re Honeywell
Int'l ERISA Litig., No. 03-1214, 2004 WL 3245931 (D.N.J., June 14, 2004).
116. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511-12 (1996).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
118. This will be discussed infra Part IV.
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examination of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions is required. In sum,
the net effect of the Russell, Mertens, and Great-West
decisions took away a substantial amount of protection and
barred a number of potential remedies that should have
been afforded to defined contribution plan participants
aggrieved by a breach of fiduciary duty. 119 As will be
discussed in detail below, application of the Russell precedent
was used to bar recovery for breach of fiduciary duty under
section 502(a)(2) if the remedy inured to an individual, or
an individual account. 120 Further, Mertens and Great-West
drastically limited even the type of equitable relief an
aggrieved participant could seek under section 502(a)(3).
The judiciary's interpretation of ERISA's civil enforce-
ment provisions was outdated, and this Comment applauds
an application of section 502(a)(2) which recognizes our
nation's increased reliance on defined contribution plans.
ERISA made pension security a basic goal of federal
policy, 121 yet prior to LaRue, precedent barred any meaningful
recovery for those whose individual retirement accounts
were depleted due to fiduciary breach. The following
discussion of Russell, Mertens, and Great-West traces the
Supreme Court's path through ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions, and explains how we ended up with precedent
that was clearly at odds with the purpose of ERISA.
A. Russell: "[Section] 409 inures to the benefit of the plan as
a whole"'122
Respondent Doris Russell was a beneficiary under two
employee benefit plans administered by petitioner
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company. 23 In May
of 1979, Russell became disabled with a back ailment and
began to receive plan benefits. 24 Russell's benefits were
terminated in October of 1979, at which time Russell
119. See infra Part V.
120. See LaRue, 450 F.3d at 570.
121. WOOTEN, supra note 9, at 3.
122. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985).
123. Id. at 136.
124. Id.
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requested a review by the petitioner's disability committee. 125
Upon submission of a report from her private physician,
Russell's benefits were reinstated and her retroactive
benefits were paid in full.126
Still, Russell claimed that she was injured by her plan's
intermittent refusal to pay her disability benefits. 127
Allegedly, the disruption of benefit payments forced
Russell's husband to cash out his retirement savings, and
this aggravated the psychosomatic condition responsible for
respondent's back problems. Accordingly, Russell sued
petitioner seeking compensatory and punitive damages for
her consequential injuries. 128
The United States District Court for the Central
District of California held that respondent's state law
claims were preempted by ERISA, however, upon appeal,
the Ninth Circuit reversed, and held that respondent's
complaint alleged a cause of action.129 Because petitioner
took 132 days to process Russell's claim, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that petitioner had violated its fiduciary duty to
act in a fair and diligent manner. This violation, the Court
of Appeals concluded, gave rise to a cause of action under
section 409(a). 130
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit's decision was reversed. While the Ninth
Circuit had focused on section 409(a)'s reference to 'other
equitable or remedial relief the court may deem appropriate,"'
as granting them authority to award compensatory and
punitive damages, the Supreme Court grounded its decision
in the statute's relationship between fiduciary breach and
recovery to the plan as a whole. 131 Focusing on ERISA's
"plan related" relief, the Supreme Court emphasized that a
contextual reading of section 409(a) made it clear that in
passing the statute, the drafters were concerned with
possible misuse of plan assets, and consequently, remedies
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 137.
130. Id. at 138.
131. Id.
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that would protect the plan as a whole, rather than with
the rights of an individual beneficiary. 132
Russell's "skewed" procedural history has been credited
with making it a "poor choice" for providing initial guidance
in interpreting ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. 133
Notably, the question addressed by the Supreme Court in
Russell concerned fiduciary liability to a participant for
extra contractual compensatory or punitive damages. 134 These
types of damages are distinguishable and unquestionably
distinct from the damages sought by aggrieved participants
whose individual retirement accounts are depleted due to
breach of fiduciary duty. 135 Still, the Russell precedent was
often applied to preclude enforcement of any individual
rights or recovery under section 502(a), and thus
perpetuated further examination of ERISA's other remedies,
like section 502(a)(3). Unfortunately, after the Supreme
Court's analysis of section 502(a)(3) in Mertens, ERISA
posed more obstacles and afforded less protection to
individual participants or subsets of participants who
suffered injury due to fiduciary breach.
B. Mertens: Section 502(a)(3) and Those Remedies
"Typically"Available in Equity136
In 1993, the Supreme Court revisited its discussion of
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions in Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates, a case examining the use of section 502(a)(3)'s
"appropriate equitable relief' to redress statutory violations.' 37
Petitioners were a class of former employees who
participated in the Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan. 38 As
Kaiser began to phase out its steelmaking operations, it
132. Id. at 142.
133. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 1338-40 (explaining that, because the
Ninth Circuit recognized a cause of action under section 502(a)(2), upon appeal
to the Supreme Court, Russell was limited to requesting a remedy under this
incorrect provision).
134. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136.
135. This will be discussed below. See infra notes 149-58 and accompanying
text.
136. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
137. Id. at 248.
138. Id. at 250.
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prompted early retirement by a large number of plan
participants. 139 However, as Kaiser's actuary, respondent
Hewitt Associates did not change the plan's actuarial
assumptions to adequately reflect additional costs the plan
experienced as a result of the high volume of early retire-
ments. 140 As a result of this error, Kaiser insufficiently
funded the plan, causing termination of the plan by the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 141 Because of this,
plan participants received only those benefits guaranteed
by ERISA, which were lower than the pensions in which
they vested under Kaiser's plan. 142
Petitioners commenced an action claiming that
respondent had caused pension losses, and that these acts
amounted to a breach of respondent's "professional duties"
owed to the plan, accordingly, an ERISA violation for which
they sought relief.143 The District Court for the Northern
District of California dismissed petitioner's complaint and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant
part.144 On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed "whether
ERISA authorizes suits for money damages against
nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a fiduciary's
breach of fiduciary duty."'145 Surprisingly, instead of basing
its decision on Hewitt's potential liability due to its non-
fiduciary status, the Supreme Court reasoned that section
502(a)(3) did not authorize plaintiffs to recover monetary
damages for Hewitt's conduct. 46
Petitioners relied on section 502(a)(3)'s provision for
"other appropriate equitable relief," arguing that respondent
should be required to repay the Kaiser plan for the losses
resulting from its participation in the breach of fiduciary
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 251.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 255; Langbein, supra note 81, at 1349-50 (discussing that this
came as somewhat of a surprise to the ERISA bar, who expected that the
Supreme Court took the case on appeal to resolve a circuit split regarding the
question of non-fiduciary liability).
2008] 337
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
duty.147 Although the petitioners maintained that the focus
of their claim was in fact "appropriate equitable relief," the
Supreme Court declined to see this sought-after remedy as
one of an equitable nature. 148
In rejecting petitioner's claim, the majority explained,
"[a]lthough they often dance around the word, what
petitioners in fact seek is nothing other than compensatory
damages-monetary relief for all losses their plan sustained
as a result of the alleged breach of fiduciary duties.
Monetary damages are, of course, the classic form of legal
relief."149 In response, petitioners argued that "equitable
relief' as understood in the context the common law of
trusts, afforded them a remedy. 150 Yet, Justice Scalia
discredited this argument with a close analysis of courts of
equity and the remedies they were permitted to provide at
common law.151
Courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over actions
for breach of trust and could award money damages against
a trustee or third person who knowingly participated in the
trustee's breach. 52 However, there were situations outside
of those involving enforcement of a trust, in which a court of
equity could "establish purely legal rights and grant legal
remedies that would otherwise be beyond the scope of its
authority."' 53 Because of this, petitioners insisted that
"equitable relief' included any relief a court of equity was
able to afford in the particular case at issue. 54
In response to petitioner's assertion that courts of
equity could grant legal remedies, the majority draws an
important distinction in its interpretation of ERISA's
"equitable relief' as "those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus,
147. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251.
148. Id. at 255.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 255-56.
151. Id. at 255-58.
152. Id. at 256.
153. Id., quoting 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §181, at 257 (5th ed.
1941).
154. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
338 [Vol. 56
RETHINKING "THE PLAN"
and restitution, but not compensatory damages)."'155 The
majority continues to explain:
In the context of the present statute, we think there can be no
doubt. Since all relief available for breach of trust could be
obtained from a court of equity, limiting the sort of relief
obtainable under § 502(a)(3) to "equitable relief' in the sense of
"whatever relief a common-law court of equity could provide in
such a case" would limit the relief not at all." We will not read the
statute to render the modifier superfluous. 156
Additionally, embracing petitioner's interpretation of
section 502(a)(3)'s "equitable relief," encompassing all relief
that was available for breach of trust at common law would
give the term another meaning, and in doing so, erase the
distinction Congress drew between "equitable" and "remedial"
in section 409(a). 157 Although petitioners contend that this
interpretation of section 502(a)(3) provides less protection
than before, consequently contradicting ERISA's goal of
promoting the interest of beneficiaries of employee benefit
plans, it is well accepted that "vague notions of a statute's
'basic purpose' are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the
words of its text regarding the specific issue under
consideration."15 8
Thus, in conjunction with Russell, the Mertens
precedent left aggrieved plan participants and beneficiaries
with a limited arsenal of remedies. Where Russell barred
any type of individual relief under section 502(a)(2) because
of section 409(a)'s requirement that a fiduciary "make good
to the plan as a whole," unfortunately, an individual injured
by fiduciary breach had little recourse under Mertens,
which severely restricted those forms of equitable relief
available under section 502(a)(3). This conundrum set the
stage for Great-West, which finally exemplified the type of
equitable remedy that section 502(a)(3) would be able to
provide.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 257-58.
157. Id. at 258.
158. Id. at 261.
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C. Great-West: Equitable Restitution and No Personal
Liability159
Finally, in 2001, the Supreme Court identified the type
of remedy that was available under section 502(a)(3)'s
"appropriate equitable relief," drawing a further distinction
between equitable and legal restitution. 160 In evaluating
whether section 502(a)(3) authorized an action for specific
performance of the reimbursement provision of the plan,
the Supreme Court turned again to an evaluation of "those
categories of relief that were typically available in
equity."'161 Namely, petitioners argued that they sought
restitution; a form of equitable relief authorized by section
502(a)(3). 162  However, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, characterized the difference between restitution
at law and restitution at equity. 163
Simply, restitution at law exists when a plaintiffs claim
for judgment imposes personal liability upon a defendant to
pay some form of monetary damages. 164 Alternatively,
restitution in equity exists where money or other property
belonging to the plaintiff could be traced to particular funds
or property in the defendant's possession. 165 In order for
restitution to lie in equity, as opposed to law, the action
159. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
160. See id. In Great-West, respondent Jannette Knudson was seriously
injured in a car accident. Her medical expenses were subsequently paid through
her health plan by petitioner Great-West. The Plan contained a reimbursement
provision that required reimbursement of any benefits paid by the plan if the
beneficiary recovered from a third party. The Knudsons filed a third party tort
action and ultimately settled for $650,000.00; however, only $13,828.70 of the
settlement was attributed to past medical expenses. Great-West initiated an
action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under section 502(a)(3) to
require the Knudsons to pay the Plan $411,157.11 of proceeds recovered from
third parties. Id. at 207-08.
161. Id. at 210 (citing Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256).
162. Id. at 212.
163. Id. at 212-14.
164. Id. at 213 (citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §160, cmt. a (1936),
which explains that in cases where a plaintiff could not assert legal title, but
had possible grounds for recovering money, claim was considered legal because
he sought "to obtain a judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the
defendant to pay a sum of money").
165. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213.
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must seek to rightfully restore to the plaintiff funds or
property in the defendant's possession, without imposing
personal liability in doing so. 166
In Great-West, respondents did not hold particular
funds that rightfully belonged to petitioners. 167 Instead,
petitioners believed that they were contractually entitled to
some of the funds that respondents possessed. 6 8 Therefore,
the majority reasoned that petitioners sought imposition of
personal liability for benefits they conferred upon
respondents; the classic form of legal restitution, and one
not authorized as "equitable relief' under section 502(a)(3). 16 9
V. LARUE: A CHANCE TO RETHINK "THE PLAN"
The impact of the Russell, Mertens, and Great-West
decisions must be evaluated in light of our nation's
increased reliance on defined contribution plans.170 ERISA
provides few meaningful remedies for those who will seek
protection and relief from fiduciary wrongdoing which
resulted in the depletion or depreciation of an individual
retirement account. Because ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions are exclusive 71 and the statute's preemption
doctrine is broad, 172 a new interpretation of section 502(a)(2)
must safeguard aggrieved defined contribution plan
participants from finding themselves without a meaningful
remedy and without financial security in their retirement
years.
Russell's skewed factual and procedural history
resulted in precedent that has been incorrectly extrapolated
166. Id. at 214.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id at 218.
170. See supra Part II.
171. See Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)
(explaining that, "[tihe six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions
found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted .. .provide strong evidence
that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly").
172. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (establishing that provisions of Title I
and Title IV of ERISA shall supersede any state laws that relate to employee
benefit plans).
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to preclude recovery to individuals (and individual retirement
accounts) harmed by fiduciary breach. 173 While the Russell
majority emphasized the connection between section
502(a)(2) and section 409(a)'s requirement that a breaching
fiduciary make good to the plan (the plan as a whole),
application of this precedent to preclude monetary recovery
to individual retirement accounts is misplaced. Russell is
distinguishable and a newer, more modern understanding
of "the plan" is necessary in light of the fact that over half of
all private plan assets, approximately three trillion dollars,
are held in defined contribution plans. 174 A modernization
of section 409(a)'s requirement that a fiduciary "be personally
liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach"175 should account for our
nation's dependence on the defined contribution arrangement.
Thus, an individual account should be considered a "plan"
for purposes of section 409(a), and as such, fiduciary breach
should be enforceable and remedies recoverable under
section 502(a)(2).
The need for this reinterpretation of "the plan" under
section 409(a) is strengthened by the impact of the Mertens
and Great-West decisions. Taken together, these precedents
drastically reduce the type of "appropriate equitable relief'
available to participants and beneficiaries under section
502(a)(3). The significance of Justice Scalia's distinctions
between legal and equitable restitution in Mertens and
Great-West provides for fruitful application of section
502(a)(3) in a very limited spectrum of circumstances. 176
Rarely will these instances of fruitful equitable restitution
under section 502(a)(3) lend themselves to remedy an
aggrieved individual after his or her defined contribution
173. See, e.g., LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 450 F.3d 570 (4th
Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).
174. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS, supra note 25, at 112.
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
176. Under Mertens, recovery is allowed under section 502(a)(3) if the relief
flows from one of the categories which was "typically available in equity."
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). Great-West further refined
the distinction between equitable restitution and restitution that imposes
personal liability on the defendant. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002). This latter legal restitution is not available
under section 502(a)(3). Id.
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plan account is depleted due to a breach of fiduciary duty. 177
The plight of James LaRue 178 illustrates the extent to
which outdated interpretations of ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions posed major barriers to defined contribution plan
participants injured by breach of fiduciary duty. As an
employee of DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc. (DeWolff),
James LaRue was eligible to participate in DeWolff s
ERISA-regulated 401(k) retirement savings plan.179 The
DeWolff plan allowed participants to manage their own
accounts by selecting from different investment portfolios.' 80
In 2001 and 2002, LaRue allegedly instructed DeWolff, the
administrator and a fiduciary of the plan, to make certain
changes to his 401(k) plan account. 8 1 However, LaRue's
instructions were ignored and his requested changes were
never made.1 8 2 As a result of DeWolffs inaction, a breach of
fiduciary duty, l8 3 LaRue's "interest in [his] plan [was]
depleted [by] approximately $150,000.00. ' '184
LaRue then initiated a suit against DeWolff seeking
equitable relief pursuant to section 502(a)(3) for his losses.'8 5
However, the District Court agreed with the defendants
that the relief LaRue sought was legal, and not equitable in
nature.18 6 Consequently, upon determining that such relief
was not available under section 502(a)(3), the case was
dismissed.187
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, LaRue supplemented
his section 502(a)(3) complaint with an additional claim
177. See the discussion regarding different types of fiduciary breach, supra
Part III.
178. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 450 F.3d 570, 572 (4th Cir.
2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).
179. LaRue, 450 F.3d at 572.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. DeWolff, as a fiduciary of the plan, did not "discharge [its] duties ...
solely in the interest of the participants." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000). This is a
breach of fiduciary duty. See id.
184. LaRue, 450 F.3d at 572.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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under section 502(a)(2). 88 Because his 401(k) plan had been
depleted, pursuant to section 502(a)(2)'s enforcement of
section 409(a), LaRue sought to make DeWolff, as a breaching
fiduciary, "personally liable to make good to [his] plan [the]
losses to [his] plan resulting from [the] breach."'1 9 However,
the Fourth Circuit did not agree. Relying on Russell, the
court reemphasized that, "[r]ecovery under [section 502(a)(2)]
must 'inure to the benefit of the plan as a whole,' not to
particular persons with rights under the plan."'190 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit grounded its interpretation of 502(a)(2) in an
outdated understanding that a participant's defined
contribution individual 401(k) account is not a "plan" within
the meaning of section 409(a). 191 This mischaracterization
was fatal to LaRue's claim at the appellate level, and has
posed similar obstacles to other defined contribution plan
participants injured by fiduciary breach.
LaRue's petition for a rehearing and a rehearing en
banc was ultimately denied by the Fourth Circuit.192
However, a chance for reinterpretation of the "plan" under
188. Id. at 573.
189. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
190. LaRue, 450 F.3d at 573 (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985)). The Fourth Circuit explained that,
it is difficult to characterize the remedy plaintiff seeks as anything
other than personal. He desires recovery to be paid into his plan
account, an instrument that exists specifically for his benefit. The
measure of that recovery is a loss suffered by him alone. And that loss
itself allegedly arose as the result of defendants' failure to follow
plaintiff's own particular instructions, thereby breaching a duty owed
solely to him.
LaRue, 450 F.3d at 574.
191. LaRue, 450 F.3d at 574.
192. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 458 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008). It is noteworthy to mention that the Secretary
of Labor filed an amicus brief in support of this rehearing. See Brief for
Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner for Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 458 F.3d 359
(4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1756). Because the Secretary has the primary authority
to investigate, interpret, and enforce the provisions of Title I of ERISA, this
analysis should be given great deference. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000)
(providing that the Secretary may initiate certain civil enforcement
proceedings); id. § 1133 (establishing claims procedures in accordance with
regulations of the Secretary); id. § 504 (granting the Secretary power to
determine whether any person has violated a provision of Title I of ERISA).
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section 502(a)(2) was not completely foreclosed. On
November 6, 2006, James LaRue filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari and on June 18, 2007 certiorari was granted. 193
On November 26, 2007, oral arguments were heard, which
provided the Supreme Court a long overdue opportunity for
revisitation and reinterpretation of section 502(a). Vacating
the Court of Appeal's decision and remanding the case, the
Supreme Court held that section 502(a)(2) "authorize[s]
recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan
assets in a participant's individual account."'194 This
reinterpretation was necessary in light of ERISA's policy
objectives and our nation's ever increasing reliance on
defined contribution plans for achieving financial
retirement security.
VI. RETHINKING "THE PLAN": WHY IT IS TIME FOR A NEW
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 502(A)(2)
A. The Prevalence and Structure of Defined Contribution
Plans Calls for a New Interpretation of Section 502(a)(2)
As mentioned above, the most recent estimates place
approximately $3 trillion of national assets, more than half
of all private pension funds, in defined contribution
plans. 195 Further, studies show that eighty percent of the
country's employees are participants in 401(k) plans. 196
Still, prior to LaRue,
[u]nder the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of 502(a)(2), the
breaching fiduciary of a "defined contribution plan" [could] enjoy
total immunity from personal liability for monetary losses caused
by even the most egregious violation of ERISA provided that the
fiduciary's misconduct ha[d] only depleted the retirement funds of
193. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 458 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2006),
petition for cert. filed, 2006 WL 3761777 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2006) (No. 06-856); LaRue
v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 458 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert.
granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. June 18, 2007) (No. 06-856).
194. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1026 (2008).
195. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS, supra note 25, at 112.
196. See 47TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF PROFIT SHARING AND 401(K) PLANS:
OVERVIEW OF SURVEY RESULTS, http://www.psca.org/DATA/47th.html (last
visited Mar. 5, 2007).
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a single participant in the plan. 197
The Fourth circuit's interpretation of "plan" ignored the
fact that in the past twenty years after the Supreme Court
interpreted section 502(a)(2) in Russell, defined contribution
plans, typified by individual account arrangements, became
the "primary vehicle for private retirement savings.' 198
Refusing to include these individual accounts within section
502(a)(2)'s meaning of "plan" took for granted our nation's
increased reliance on defined contribution plans, ignoring
the importance of America's financial security during
retirement years.
Moreover, this outdated interpretation of section
502(a)(2) overlooked the defined contribution plan's inherent
mechanism of recovery, whereby relief inures directly into
an individual account. 199  Defined contribution plans
typically offer a variety of investment options in which
participants can direct their own portfolio arrangements. 200
This flexibility results in an infinite possibility of
investment permutations, and thus, it is seldom the case
that a fiduciary breach will have a direct impact on every
single participant's account. 20' For these reasons, fiduciary
breach in the context of defined contribution plans
participation are likely to affect individuals on an account
by account basis. Therefore, logically it follows that ERISA
should allow for defined contribution plan participants to
seek recovery to their individual account plans under
197. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs.,
Inc., 450 F.3d 570 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-856).
198. Brief of Seven Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 10, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 450 F.3d 570 (4th Cir. 2006)
(No. 06-856), 2007 WL 160718.
199. See id. at 7. The law professors explain that, "[t]he Fourth Circuit's
holding, that the requested relief did not constitute a 'loss to [the] plan,' is
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the inherent structure of an
individual account plan. In such a plan, a loss to any individual account
constitutes a loss to the plan because the monies in the individual account are
nothing less than the very res of the trust itself." Id. at 6.
200. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEcuRITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A LOOK AT
401(K) PLAN FEES 1 (2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/
401k-employee.html [hereinafter PLAN FEES].
201. See Muir, supra note 18, at 235 (commenting that, "[i]n [defined
contribution] plans, fiduciary breaches that cause loss to the plan typically
cause that loss by affecting the value of individual participants' accounts").
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section 502(a)(2).
A closer look at defined contribution plan administration
also lends support to the argument that, pursuant to
section 502(a)(2), aggrieved plan participants should be able
to seek a remedy that runs to their individual accounts.
Generally speaking, the total amount of assets in a defined
contribution plan are used to defray the costs of
administration fees. These fees include expenses for day to
day services such as plan recording, accounting, legal, and
trustee services that are necessary for operation of the plan
as a whole. 20 2 These costs may be deducted directly from
returns on investments, borne by the employer, or charged
directly against the assets of the plan.203
When administrative fees are paid directly by the plan,
they are either allocated among individual accounts in
proportion to each account balance (i.e., participants with
larger account balances pay more of the allocated expenses)
or passed through as a flat fee against each participant's
account.20 4 Therefore, any recovery that is allocated to a
participant's individual account has the net affect of
increasing the overall volume of plan assets.20 5
Alternatively, any "diminution in value of the interest of an
individual account holder in a defined contribution plan is,
by definition, a loss to the plan and, therefore, remediable
under 502(a)(2)." 20 6 Thus, it follows that even the most
seemingly individual recovery still has the effect of inuring
to the benefit of the plan as a whole.
202. PLAN FEES, supra note 200, at 4.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
6, LaRue v. De Wolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 450 F.3d 570 (4th Cir. 2006) (No.
06-856).
206. Brief of Seven Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 8, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 450 F.3d 570 (4th Cir. 2006) (No.
06-856).
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B. Application of Russell Does Not Bind the Judiciary to an
Obsolete Interpretation of 502(a)(2) Nor Does it Preclude
Recovery to a Defined Contribution Plan's Individual
Account
In adopting an interpretation of 502(a)(2) which more
aptly recognizes the prevalence and structure of defined
contribution plan arrangements, the Supreme Court finally
distinguished its "entire plan" rationale in Russell from the
type of injury experienced by LaRue. 20 7 Simply stated,
Russell held that a single plan participant could not proceed
with a claim under 502(a)(2) for individual recovery for extra-
contractual damages. 20  The Court clarified that its
previous holding should not preclude recovery where defined
contribution plan participants seek relief that flows into his
or her individual account.20 9
Notably, the Court acknowledged that in Russell, its
reference to the "entire plan" emphasized the impact of
section 409 on defined benefit arrangements. 210 In doing so
it explained that:
Misconduct by the administrators of a defined benefit plan will not
affect an individual's entitlement to a defined benefit unless it
creates or enhances the risk of default by the entire plan .... For
defined contribution plans, however, fiduciary misconduct need
not threaten the solvency of the entire plan to reduce benefits
below the amount that participants would otherwise receive.
Whether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all
participants and beneficiaries, or only to persons tied to particular
individual accounts, it creates the kinds of harms that concerned
the draftsmen of [section] 409.211
Therefore, distinguishing Russell's "entire plan" language
from the defined contribution context in LaRue now allows
for an application of section 502(a)(2) which provides relief
to an individual defined contribution account upon breach
of fiduciary duty.
207. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1025 (2008).
208. See Milofsky v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 404 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2005), vacated
en banc, 442 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2006) (King, C.J., dissenting).
209. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025.
210. See id.
211. Id.
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C. Department of Labor Objectives
Lastly, it is important to note that the Department of
Labor (D.O.L.), the governmental body with authority over
the implementation of Title I of ERISA, has presented the
public with a number of retirement security objectives. 212
Particularly of interest to this discussion is the Employee
Benefits Security Administration's new 401(k) enforcement
initiative. 213 This initiative notes:
The Labor Department's Employee Benefits Security Administration
(EBSA) is committed to safeguarding employee contributions to
401(k) plans . . . by investigating situations in which employers
improperly delay forwarding employee contributions to the
appropriate funding vehicle or simply convert the contributions to
other non-plan uses.2 14
Thus, as of January 2007, the Department of Labor has
taken specific strides to recognize and combat the "new"
types of fiduciary breach that plague defined contribution
plan arrangements. Mr. LaRue suffered from exactly the
type of breach identified above; his individual retirement
account was depleted because the DeWolff fiduciary failed
to forward Mr. LaRue's contributions to the correct
investment account in a timely manner. 215 Therefore, this
"401(k) Enforcement Initiative" is significant because it
signals that the Department of Labor has recognized a need
for change in its Employee Benefit Security Administrative
services. The D.O.L.'s change in services, offering the new
efforts for 401(k) fiduciary surveillance, was unquestionably
caused by a change in our nation's pension landscape and
our dependence on the defined contribution plan for
retirement security. Fortunately, the Supreme Court's
212. See PLAN FEES, supra note 200; see also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PROTECT YOUR PENSION: A QUICK REFERENCE
GUIDE (2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/protect-your
pension.html; WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT YOUR RETIREMENT PLAN, supra
note 7.
213. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., RETIREMENT SECURITY
INITIATIVES, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.dol.gov/
ebsa/newsroom/fsecp.html.
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 450 F.3d 570, 570 (4th Cir.
2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).
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reinterpretation of "plan" in section 502(a)(2) now also
acknowledges our nation's increased reliance on the defined
contribution arrangement.
CONCLUSION
Although this [re]interpretation of section 502(a)(2) of
ERISA was long overdue, the Supreme Court recognized
that LaRue provided an opportunity to realign statutory
interpretation and precedent with the twenty-first century.
Defined contribution plans are currently the most utilized
means as the majority of Americans prepare for retirement
security. "To deprive [these defined contribution] plan
participants ... a § 409 remedy for breach of fiduciary duty
[would] effectively nullif[y] Congress' intent to provide a
high level of protection to any and all plan participants
from fiduciary abuse. '216
If Americans are to enjoy retirements free of severe financial
worries in the 21st century, then the pension plans sponsored by
private employers must contain sufficient assets to provide
expected and needed benefits. ERISA's fiduciary and remedial
provisions are critical in ensuring that the assets in [defined
benefit] plans are not squandered by careless or criminal
fiduciaries. Those same provisions also protect the assets in
[defined contribution] plans. No significant amendments to either
ERISA's fiduciary provisions or its remedial provisions have been
enacted since the passage of the statute in 1974. Depending on the
way jurisprudence develops, however, reforms in these provisions
may become vital to ensure appropriate protection of plan assets.
In the context of the investment of plan assets, fiduciaries of
overfunded [defined benefit] plans should not be given a free pass
for fiduciary violations. Nor should participants in [defined
contribution] plans be left without adequate remedies to address
violations by plan sponsors or any kind of plan service provider.2 17
As stated above, defined contribution plan participants
deserve enforceable remedies that address the egregious
breaches of fiduciary duty that leave them with depleted
retirement accounts and without financial security for the
future. LaRue's redefinition of the "plan" in section 502(a)(2)
216. Milofsky v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 404 F.3d 338, 348 (5th Cir. 2005) (King,
J., dissenting).
217. Muir, supra note 18, at 247-48 (emphasis added).
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to include the individual accounts typified in defined
contribution plans is an appropriate construction considering
the prevalence and popularity of this type of pension
arrangement and the goals of ERISA to make pension
security a basic goal of federal policy. 218
218. See WOOTEN, supra note 9, at 3.
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